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The purpose of this article is to assess how the changing operations of international 
banks in emerging countries in the last decades have altered the risks they face as well 
as their mitigation techniques. The recent expansion of the international banking 
business through the setup of branches and subsidiaries  has increased  business 
potential, but has also changed the nature of the risks faced. Nevertheless, it is hard to 
determine whether  risks,  on the whole, are larger now than when cross-border 
operations were the main instrument for international banks’ activity. In addition, the 
article describes the various channels through which the risks faced by banks operating 
in emerging countries increase in times of crisis, especially when operating locally and 
in highly dollarized host countries, as  shown in  the latest crisis events.  While  the 
financial independence  of subsidiaries may be considered  an important tool of  risk 
control, the possibilities to mitigate  risks in local markets during times  of crisis are 
generally scarce. This could be due to the relatively recent expansion of foreign banks’ 
local  operations in emerging countries, as compared to the  cross-border business, 
together with the relative underdevelopment of local financial markets, or perhaps to 
the nature of the local business itself. 
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Bank international operations have continued to grow all over the world and particularly in 
emerging countries. The first grew mainly through cross-border operations and more 
recently also through the establishment of branches and subsidiaries abroad. This has 
changed the business potential as well as the structure of risks faced by banks and their 
mitigation strategies. Furthermore, the Argentine crisis has been an important negative 
event  for banks operating abroad.  Going forward, banks will need to take a broader 
perspective when assessing risk so that it can be better managed.  
 
In this note we a nalyse the ways in which international banks operate overseas, 
particularly in emerging countries, the risks they face and the ways to manage them. Our 
perspective is that of the investor and not of the host country. 
 
Among the many financial operations which can take place internationally, we concentrate 
on the banking sector, either directly through cross-border lending, or indirectly through 
local operations in another country, in the form of a branch or a subsidiary.  We also 
distinguish between foreign  currency  versus domestic currency operations, and normal 
times versus crisis periods.   
 
Two notes of caution apply.  First, the classification of risks we p resent is largely 
conceptual. It does not necessarily coincide with other usual risk classification used by 
regulators or supervisors
3 but does not contradict it either. Second, we separate risks for 
the purpose of the analysis although they are obviously interconnected. This means that 
the risks we analyse cannot simply be added and that it will be difficult to assess which 
type of international bank operation (cross-border, local activity through a subsidiary or 
through a branch) bears more risk. 
 
2. Recent trends 
 
From cross-border lending to local activity: 
 
The operation of international banks in emerging countries has increased significantly over 
the last few decades but its nature has changed, and so have the risks international banks 
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face. Back in the early 1980´s, most banking business in emerging markets was 
conducted through cross-border lending. Since mid -1990´s however, banks increased FDI 
to emerging markets and, as a consequence,  banking business through international 
banks´ branches and subsidiaries in emerging markets more than quadrupled.  
 
These trends in international banking can be traced  using the  Bank for International 
Settlements consolidated banking statistics and information from national bank supervisory 
authorities. In the latter case, we acknowledge potential problems of comparability.  
 
The operations of international banks in emerging countries, measured by their foreign 
claims
4 from  Bank for International Settlements statistics (which  include cross-border 
claims and local claims in domestic and foreign currencies)  amount to just about one 
eighth of foreign claims among developed countries (1,4 trillion US$ in 2002 as compared 
to 1 1,4 trillion  US$  for industrial countries
5).   However, in the course of the last two 
decades, and particularly in the 1990s, foreign claims to emerging countries have more 
than doubled.  
 
More interesting to our purposes is the fact that, in the last decade, local claims in local 
currency in emerging countries have escalated rapidly, reaching the current mark of 40% 
of all foreign claims to emerging countries. Back in the early eighties, local claims in local 
currency accounted for a meagre 5% of total lending to emerging countries (see Graph 1). 
Therefore, even if international claims to emerging countries (which include cross-border 
claims in all currencies and local claims in foreign currencies) are still comparatively higher 
today, at 60% of foreign claims, their weight in the total foreign claims of international 
banks in emerging countries is in a clear downward trend. In contrast, local claims in local 
currency in industrial countries have remained stable in the last years, at about 30% of all 
foreign claims (see Graph 2). 
 
“Going local” appears to be the  leading strategy of international banks which want to 
operate in emerging countries
6. Local claims in local currency have risen sharply in Asia, 
Emerging Europe, Africa and especially Latin America. In this region, local claims in local 
currency are currently  over 50% of foreign claims  from levels below 5% in the early 
eighties (see Graph 3, 4 and 5).  
 
In addition, it should be noted that the Bank for International Settlements consolidated data 
inevitably bias downwards local banking activity, since foreign-currency denominated local 
claims are treated as if they were cross-border lending (i.e., they are included in banks’ 
international claims). This is particularly relevant for highly dollarized emerging countries, 
many of which are in the Latin American region. 
 
This, coupled with the relatively small size of the banking systems in Latin America and 
Central and Eastern Europe, explains that foreign-owned banks represent over half of the 
banking system in many of these countries, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe
7. 
 
                                              
4 Following the notation of the consolidated banking statistics of the BIS 
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The choice of branches versus subsidiaries
8 
 
In the last few years,  international banks  have  increasingly used subsidiaries  for their 
operations in emerging markets, although the number of branches is still higher in some 
regions. This trend is not as clear in industrial countries, where the number of branches is 
generally larger than that of subsidiaries, particularly in financial centers
9. In the case of 
Latin America, according to a survey on foreign bank participation by Centro de Estudios 
Monetarios Latinoamericanos
10, there were as many as 105 foreign banks set up through 
Greenfield investments in 1994 while  only 6 foreign banks had entered  the market  by 
acquiring a previously existing bank.
11 In 1998, foreign banks set up through Greenfield 
investment  had increased moderately, to  136, while foreign banks  entering through 
acquisitions (subsidiaries) rose exponentially, to 56. Even making the strong assumption 
that all Greenfield investment was in the form of branches, the increase in the number of 
subsidiaries is undoubtedly large  (see Graph  6). In the case of Central and Eastern 
Europe, where foreign participation in the local b anking system is the highest of all 
regions, subsidiaries are much more widespread.  
 
The choice of the legal form is not a point of detail but may have substantial implications 
(Tchoegl 2003). Foreign subsidiaries are individual legal entities or incorporated banks 
created under the law of the host country. They have separate accounts from those of the 
parent company and are financially independent. They have to comply with the host 
country capital requirements, the host country deposit insurance scheme, and are subject 
to the host country supervision. In turn, foreign branches are unincorporated banks or 
bank offices located in a foreign country. They are an integral part of the bank and not 
legal entities,  generally  do not have separate accounts, and can  not take  strategic 
economic decisions, or incur in liabilities, or own assets in their own right. 
 
In addition, branches are able to lend, borrow or trade on the basis of their head office´s 
full capital base. That is why international banks usually choose this form of legal presence 
for wholesale and corporate banking activities.  The branch can also  borrow at 
advantageous rates as it carries the same credit rating as the head office. Subsidiaries,  
generally more focused on retail banking, may borrow on the basis of their own 
capitalization and financing, and not those of the parent bank although the latter may 
decide to inject funds to the subsidiary if deemed appropriate  The term “financial 
independence” refers to this option. Such financial independence is an important tool of 
risk control for the parent bank during crisis periods, which is not available in the case of a 
branch. Branches are supposed to have full head office backing.  
 
3. Risks and risk mitigation in normal times.  
 
The evolving nature of international banks´ operations in emerging markets has changed 
the nature of the risks faced and also the capacity to mitigate them.  
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In normal times, operating locally has some advantages which explain its expansion during 
the last decade. One of the most relevant is its higher business potential as the funding to 
increase the bank’s balance sheet, after the initial investment is made, can be obtained 
locally. This is not the case of cross-border lending, which needs to be funded fully by the 
head office and whose profitability  is  based on the interest rate margin of that single 
operation. Opening a bank will always be a more leveraged operation than cross-border 
lending, and in consequence with more business potential.  
 
The risks faced by an international bank with cross border lending are different in nature 
from those  of local operations. Within the local activity, the risks are not the same for 
branches and subsidiaries. However, it is hard to tell which option is riskier. It will very 
much depend on whether the situation in the host country is normal or is a crisis one. 
Branches are closer to a cross-border loan in the nature of the risks they face, simply 
because their operations are not independent from those of the head office. In contrast, 
subsidiaries can  be seen as closer to a local bank, as they have to be financially 
independent, comply with the host country capital requirements, the host country deposit 
insurance scheme, and are subject to the host country supervision. This is why in normal 
times, country risk
 is limited for subsidiaries to the investment made and does not affect 
the international bank´s whole balance sheet. C ross-border transactions, however, are 
subject to country risk, since they are directly financed by the parent bank
12 (see Box I for 
definitions of the different types of risks involved in banks’ international operations). Apart 
from the general mitigation tools for insolvency risk described below, country risk can be 
mitigated,  although not eliminated, through political risk insurance made available by 
official, multilateral and private sector sources
13. This  latter  possibility is still relatively 
limited and underdeveloped, particularly for the local operations.  
 
Insolvency risk affects  cross-border lending and  local operations of  branches  and 
subsidiaries in a similar way, since it depends on the capability and willingness to pay of all 
banks’ borrowers. Insolvency risk interacts very closely with sovereign risk as an increase 
in the latter generally raises insolvency risk. An example of this is the generally automatic 
transmission of a downgrade in a  sovereign rating to  the c ompanies of that country. 
Provisioning, eligible collateral, guarantees  and credit derivatives are typically u sed to 
mitigate insolvency  risk. However, given the scarcity of such instruments in emerging 
markets, other more simple mitigating techniques are  also  used, such as limiting the 
exposure to the public sector to the average levels of the local banking system or, more 
generally, applying strict concentration limits.
14  
 
Market risks affect both cross border and local operations of international banks. Cross-
border lending bears interest rate risk, but not exchange rate risk since it is generally 
denominated in hard foreign currency
15. Branches and subsidiaries bear interest rate and 
exchange rate risk in their net open positions. From the point of view of the head office or 
the parent bank, exchange rate risk is particularly important in branches and subsidiaries 
located in emerging countries where domestic currencies tend to depreciate over time. 
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Such exchange rate risk may stem from short open positions in foreign currency but also 
from the fact that the structural position or FDI is denominated in local currency but is 
financed in  hard currency. Therefore, the valuation of the stake is made in the local 
currency in the subsidiary’s financial statements,  and is then translated into the home 
currency for valuation on the consolidated balance sheet. A depreciation of the local 
currency implies a loss. This specific type of exchange rate risk is sometimes known as 
“translation risk”. It is larger for subsidiaries than for branches because the investment 
made locally is also bigger. 
 
Market risks can be covered using derivatives (options, forwards, NDFs, futures or swaps) 
which are available in international markets to hedge cross-border exposures
16. However, 
local derivatives markets  are typically insufficiently developed  in emerging countries to 
hedge very large orders without having a substantial influence on market prices. In the 
absence of a currency derivatives market in the country where the investment has been 
made, banks could also decide to use the currency of another closely correlated country. 
This is known as proxy-hedging, a phenomenon well known in Asia or Latin America, 
where investors hedge their positions in the most liquid currency markets in the regions. 
However proxy-hedging offers little protection against country-specific shocks. When 
derivatives markets are insufficiently developed, an investor may still use the cash market 
to hedge exchange rate risk. One example is borrowing in local currency for an amount 
equal to the investment, using this investment as collateral or issuing securities in the local 
capital market to fund the investment and match assets and liabilities. However, the size of 
the investment will be key to determine to what extent it can be hedged. Finally, one 
possibility to hedge the foreign exchange risk of the FDI would be to denominate it in a 
hard foreign currency. However, this is not always allowed by the host country regulations.  
 
Liability liquidity risk should not be a problem for foreign banks in normal times, as, unlike 
local banks, they have the possibility to access the parent or head office. Liquidity risk can 
also be mitigated by general tools, such as estimating the stability of deposits, or interbank 
market access, as well as the interaction with the asset side of the balance sheet.  
  
Reputational risk  is likely to be higher for branches and subsidiaries with a strong 
regional brand name than for the more distant and usually more geographically diversified 
cross-border business, and might be even more important in normal times, when banks 
need to take full responsibility for their performance and cannot attribute responsibility to 
governments for their actions.  
 
Finally,  operational risk  will  generally  tend  higher when operating abroad because 
consolidated process, systems and the people's knowledge of the strategy of the bank is 
more complicated. This i s more so in emerging countries where the infrastructure for 
banks’ operation tends to be poor (payment and settlement systems among others) but it 
is generally lower for foreign than local banks because their operational risk managements 
techniques are generally common to the rest of the group. 
 
4.  Risks in Crisis periods  
 
Risk mitigation is not crisis-proof since not every risk can be fully hedged and anticipated. 
One feature of crises is that risks that used to be manageable in normal times spill over 
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into other types of risks, making most hedges ineffective and general provisioning 
insufficient. Besides, unforeseen risks can appear which may be difficult to anticipate. 
 
One archetypical case of financial crisis may arise from a sovereign default. Traditionally 
sovereign defaults used to hit international banks’ cross-border activity or their portfolio 
holdings of emerging countries’ external debt. This was because their local business was 
small but also because sovereigns typically defaulted on their external debt while 
maintaining a flow of payments –or compensations - to the domestic banking system. One 
of the most frequently used types of compensation, albeit indirect, was a surge in inflation. 
Against the framework of increasing foreign participation in the financial systems of 
emerging countries, sovereign defaults on domestic debt  (or similar measures of 
realization of country risk) are becoming more frequent. As the Argentine case shows, 
their impact on the local operations of international banks can be very negative. This is 
more so in countries where the government is a large issuer, particular in foreign-currency, 
and banks hold a substantial share of government securities in their portfolios. This sharp 
increase in sovereign risk in a crisis situation is a clear issue but difficult to mitigate since 
well developed markets do not exist.  Political risk insurance provided by official but also 
private institutions is growing but it is still insufficient for the needs. In addition, there are 
still problems with the definition of the terms of the realization of risk, which inhibit a faster 
growth. As a consequence, it is an open question whether the local activity of international 
banks is less exposed or better able to manage  country  risk than the cross-border 
business during difficult periods.  In fact, the whole balance sheet of subsidiaries or 
branches is subject to country  risk during a crisis.  
 
Default by the sovereign is not the only extreme risk that banks can face in a crisis when 
operating locally. A political crisis leading to expropriation or nationalization of the bank 
could make an international bank lose the capital maintained locally and any future 
positive cash flow. Again, this kind of risk is extremely difficult to cover.  
 
If country risk materialized to the extent of depleting the capital of a foreign-owned bank, a 
branch is in principle more exposed than a subsidiary to future losses because of the head 
office legal obligation to inject funds, unless ring fencing
17 provisions apply. In the case of 
a subsidiary, being financially independent, the parent bank has the choice to inject new 
funds or not. Such decision will depend on a number of factors. The most important, 
probably is the expectation of future earnings, which will be subject to high uncertainty at 
the time of the decision. Other two relevant factors are the additional injection of funds 
needed to maintain the bank afloat, again highly uncertain, and the estimated reputational 
cost of exiting the country. As previously mentioned this cost may be different depending 
on the origin of the bank problems. The Argentine crisis seems to indicate that the 
reputational cost is lower if bank problems stem from the discretional action of the host 
country authorities.  
 
Crisis situations can also induce “unequal treatment” between local and foreign-owned 
banks. When public funds are insufficient to cover all banks’ needs, crisis situations may 
imply different access to the central bank liquidity or to government measures to support 
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the soundness of the banking system, such as recapitalization funds after government 
action during a crisis contributes to wiping out banks’ capital. 
 
Banks will also have difficulties in mitigating foreign exchange risk in a crisis situation. 
This is particularly worrisome in highly dollarized emerging countries since  foreign-
currency denominated loans will be much harder to repay by the borrowers in the event of 
devaluation, particularly for the non tradable sector of the economy. In addition, sovereign 
risks i ncreases sharply  when  a large part of the public debt  is  denominated in hard 
currency. This is sometimes known as  “collective credit risk”, reflecting the close 
interaction between the foreign exchange and credit risk in times of crisis.  
 
Another important risk of international banks’ local activity in times of crisis  is  asset 
liquidity risk.  In emerging countries, government paper and other generally tradable 
assets are generally not very liquid, and much less so in the run-up to a crisis. Assets will 
tend to lose value sharply precisely when more needed. This risk may affect the local and 
cross-border activity in a similar way. Funding liquidity risk will also be important during 
stress times, particularly in countries with a history of systemic banking crisis and deposit 
runs.  From the viewpoint of the international bank, s uch risk will tend to be lower for 
subsidiaries than branches since the parent bank can decide to limit the funds granted, 
while this is generally not possible for a head office with its branches. However,  as 
previously mentioned, this strategy is not risk-free. In any event, funding liquidity risk is 
likely to be lower for foreign banks, which typically benefit from flight to quality flows, than 
for local banks. In addition, banks can have their own rules of thumb to limit liquidity risk, 
which they apply more strictly in stress situations, such  as  remaining  very  liquid, or 
financing lending and reserve requirements only with deposits, without resorting to 
interbank borrowing.  
 
Contagion risk  appears during crisis situations. It stems from the operations in one 
emerging country in crisis and may affect the parent bank or head office, or the local 
activities of the international bank in another country. Contagion risk should be lower for 
the cross-border lending, which is generally less concentrated regionally and has less 
leverage, than for branches or subsidiaries.  Contagion risk  is  complex to handle. The 
obvious way to limit it –but certainly not a fast one – is to reduce excessive regional or 
sector concentration by closing some lines of business in the regional area or sector or by 
expanding other areas or sectors with a very different economic cycle
18. Other a priori 
ways to reduce the risk of contagion is to encourage the set up of financially-independent 
subsidiaries although, in certain cases, ring fencing provisions have used to limit contagion 
risk in the case of branches too. 
 
Reputational risk is a particularly important issue for international banks operating in 
countries under crisis since this is the time when there is a certain probability that they do 
not to honour their obligations, either voluntarily or induced by a government decision. As 
previously mentioned, this risk will tend to be higher the more “voluntary” the decision. 
Banks with a strong regional, or global, brand are also more exposed to this risk, and 
particularly in the case of branches. Reputational risk is also hard to mitigate especially in 
the case of a branch in which liquidity support from the head office is taken for granted. 
However, the fact that the materialization of reputational risk may be endogenous to the 
reasons behind it is a mitigation tool in itself. 
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Recent crisis events have shown the importance  of upgrading  risk management 
techniques  for international banks  operating in emerging markets.  Some b anks have 
started to calculate their profitability on the basis of explicitly risk-weighted capital. Other 
have begun to refocus their activities  towards those emerging markets considered as 
relatively less risky. There is also partial evidence that parent companies are cutting back 
on the volume of intra-group loans in order to encourage their subsidiaries to become 
completely independent, and depend only on their own funding to grow. Finally, even if the 
cost of hedging is considered prohibitive in many cases, banks are reportedly using more 




The review of developments in international banking in emerging countries  marks a 
change in pattern towards more local activity in emerging markets particularly in the form 
of branches, versus the traditional cross-border business. Going local has  probably 
increased the business potential of international banks, but has also  changed the risk 
profile of banks’ balance sheets in terms of country, market and liquidity risks, although it 
is difficult to determine whether those risks, on the whole, have increased compared to 
those which international banks used to incur with cross-border lending to emerging 
countries. As a consequence, risk management of banks’ international activities has also 
changed.  
 
Both in terms of risk and of risk management techniques, it is important to differentiate 
between quiet periods and crisis times. Starting with the former, one of the main changes 
that has taken place refers to the country risk and country risk management. In quiet 
times, the country risk faced by subsidiaries is similar to that of a local bank, given that 
subsidiaries conduct a very similar business (mainly retail), are financially independent, 
comply with the capital requirements and the deposit insurance scheme of the host 
country and are subject to the host country supervision. In turn, the country risk faced by a 
branch is, in nature, similar to that of the cross-border business, given that the branch 
operations are not independent from the head office and are financed from the latter.  
 
Insolvency risk, however, affects branches, subsidiaries and the cross-border business in 
a very similar manner, given that it primarily depends on the borrowers´ capacity and 
willingness to meet their obligations.  
 
Exposure to market risk has also changed with the increasing weight of l ocal activity. 
While cross border loans are usually denominated in hard currency, the local activity is 
generally denominated in local currency, except in highly dollarized countries, but this is 
also not without risks. 
 
Liability liquidity risk should not be a problem for international banks during quiet times, 
given that the parent company has the option, and the head office the obligation (except in 
cases of ring fencing), of transferring funds to their subsidiaries or branches in case of 
need. Finally, reputation risk tends to be higher for those international banks with local 
operations under a well-known regional name than those operating in the cross-border 
business which is typically more geographically diversified.  
 
In times of crises, risks increase and are sometimes transformed into different ones, 
making its management more complicated  particularly in emerging countries where   10 
financial markets tend to be underdeveloped  A case in point is a sovereign default of the 
domestic public debt, which may have a very negative impact on the local operations of 
international banks. Another case is a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate in highly 
dollarized countries, which will translate into an increase in the credit risk faced by banks. 
In addition, in crisis situations unforeseen risks may appear. This is the case of a potential 
unequal treatment of local and international banks.  
 
As regards risk mitigation, one key consideration is that complex risk management tools 
such as derivatives are usually only available in international markets. That is why risk 
may be harder to manage in emerging markets, and much more so during crisis times.  
 
Summing up, we can conclude that the difference between quiet periods and crisis times is 
important when operating locally in emerging markets. This is so  not only because of 
potentially higher risks, but also because  risks are harder to manage given the close 
interactions among them.  
 
   11 
Box: Risk classification 
 
Risk is defined as the probability of being hit by a loss. Risk has traditionally been classified 
by regulators and by risk rating agencies according to the cause originating the loss. There 
are many classifications of risks and the denominations change across classifications. This is 
partially because the origin of a loss, and thereby the risks, can be multifaceted. 
Acknowledging that risks s hould be considered globally, we provide with a working 
classification, useful for the purpose of our analysis. 
 
Credit risk is the probability that a debtor defaults on its debt. This is the most relevant risk 
for banks, as is intrinsic to any credit transaction. When operating abroad, credit risk can take 
two forms: country risk and insolvency risk. 
 
Country risk refers to host government actions (or non-actions) and necessarily implies two 
different territorial jurisdictions. Country risk is usually split into (i) Sovereign risk, stemming 
from the inability or unwillingness of a government to pay its debt. (ii) Transfer risk, which 
refers to the imposition of restrictions to convert local currency into hard currency and/or 
repatriate it, and (iii) Political risk, stemming from regulatory or government actions such as 
legal changes, particularly confiscation, expropriation and nationalization, as well as war or 
civil unrest.  
 
Insolvency risk is the probability of loss because a debtor defaults in its obligations due to 
the normal course of business. Insolvency risk can stem from all sectors in the economy. It 
increases during economic downturns or if country risk rises sharply. This implies that credit 
events such as a sovereign default, moratorium, currency inconvertibility, expropriations or 
war are generally accompanied by a parallel increase in insolvency risk.  
 
Market risk stems from fluctuations in interest, exchange rates, and asset prices. It is 
particularly important for some types of international bank business, such as securities 
trading or in general investment banks.  
 
Liquidity risk can be regarded from the asset or liability side of a bank’s balance sheet. 
Asset liquidity risk reflects the possibility that an entity will be unable to unwind a position in 
a financial instrument because the market is not deep enough or there is a disruption in its 
functioning when the bank wishes to liquidate that position. Liability liquidity risk or funding 
risk stems from the maturity of deposits, many of which can be withdrawn at any time.  
 
Contagion risk is the possibility that problems in a subsidiary or branch may directly 
affect the head office or parent bank or another branch or subsidiary of the same international 
bank in a country related to the one where the problem initiates. The latter is sometimes 
called “common lender contagion channel”
19 and is higher the more the investment is 
concentrated in a single region or sector. 
 
Reputational risk is related to a potential worsening of the corporate image of a bank if it fails 
to honour its commitments or obligations. The reputation of a bank depends on the corporate 
image that a foreign bank has accumulated in a country or region or even globally. 
 
Finally, operational risk is defined as the possibility to incur in losses because of inadequate 
or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. 
 
                                              
19Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) Graphic 1 
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Graphic 3 
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